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Abstract:
The cloud database as a service is novel paradigms
that can be support several Internet-based
applications, its adoption requires the solution of the
information confidentiality problems. We proposed a
novel architecture for adaptive encryption of public
cloud databases that offers an interesting alternative to
the tradeoff between the required data confidentiality
level and the flexibility of the cloud database
structures at time. We demonstrate the feasibility and
performance of the proposed solution through a
software prototype. We propose an original cost model
that is oriented to the evaluation of cloud database
services in plain text and encrypted instances and that
takes into account the variability of cloud prices and
tenant workloads during a medium-term period.
I. Introduction
The cloud computing paradigm is successfully
converge as the fifth utility [1], but this positive
trend is partially limited by concerns about
information confidentiality[2] and unclear costs over a
medium-long term [3], [4].We are interested in the
database as a service paradigm (DBaaS) [5] that
poses several research challenges in terms of
security and cost evaluation from a tenant’s point
of view. Most results concerning encryption
for cloud-based services [6], [7] are inapplicable to
the data- base paradigm. Other encryption schemes
that allow the execution of SQL operations over
encrypted data either have performance limits
[8] or require the choice of which encryption
scheme must be adopted for each database
column and SQL operation [9]. These latter
proposals are fine when the set of queries can
be statically determined at design time, while we are
interested in other common scenarios where the
workload may change after the data- base design.
In this paper, we propose a novel architecture for
adaptive encryption of public cloud databases that
offers a proxy-free alternative     to    the system
described in [10].
The proposed architecture guarantees in an
adaptive way the best level of data
confidentiality for any database workload, even
when the set of SQL queries dy- namically
changes. The adaptive encryp- tion scheme,
which was initially proposed for applications not
referring to the cloud, encrypts each plain column
to multiple encrypted columns, and each value is
encapsulated in different layers of en- cryption,
so that the outer layers guarantee higher
confidentiality but support fewer com- potation
capabilities with respect to the inner layers.
The use of fully homomorphism encryption [11] would
guarantee the execution of any operation over encrypted
data, but existing implementa- tions are affected by
huge computational costs to the extent that the
execution of SQL opera- tions over a cloud    database
would become impractical.  Other encryption
algorithms cha- racterized by acceptable computational
com- plexity support a subset   of SQL opera- tors [12],
[13], [14]. For example, an encryption algorithm may
support the order comparison command [12], but not a
search operator [14]. The drawback related to these
feasible encryption algorithms is that in a medium-
long term horizon, the database   administrator
cannot know at design time which database operations
will be required over each database  column. This
issue is in part addressed in [10] by pro- posing an
adaptive encryption architecture that is founded on an
intermediate and   trusted proxy.
II. Related work
Improving the confidentiality of information stored in
cloud databases represents an important contribution to
the adoption of the cloud as the fifth utility because
it addresses most user concerns. Our proposal is
characterized by two main contributions to the state of
the art: architecture and cost model. Although data
encryption seems the most intuitive solution for
confidentiality, its application to cloud    data- base
services is not trivial, because the cloud database
must be able to execute SQL operations directly over
encrypted data without accessing any decryption  key.
Native solutions encrypt the whole   database through
some standard  encryption algorithms that do not allow
to execute any SQL operation directly on the cloud.   As
a consequence, the tenant has two alternatives:
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download the entire database, decrypt it, execute the
query and, if the operation modifies the data- base,
encrypt and upload the new data; decrypt temporarily the
cloud database, execute the     query, and re-
encrypt it. The former solution is affected by huge
communication and computation over- heads, and
consequent costs that would make cloud database
services  quite  inconvenient; the latter solution does not
guarantee data   confidentiality because the cloud
provider obtains decryption keys.
The right alternative is to execute SQL opera- tions
directly on the   cloud   database, without giving
decryption keys to the provider. An ini- tial solution
presented in [5] is based on data aggregation techniques
[8],that associate plain- text metadata to sets of encrypted
data. However, plaintext metadata may leak sensitive
information and data aggregation introduces
unnecessary network overheads.
Fig. 1.Encrypted cloud database architecture.
The proposed system supports adaptive encryp- tion for
public cloud database services,   where distributed and
concur- rent clients can issue direct   SQL operations. By
avoiding an archi- tecture based   on intermediate
servers [10] be- tween the clients and the cloud
database, the proposed solution guarantees the same
level of scalability and availability of the cloud service.
Fig. 1 shows a scheme of the proposed archi- tecture
where each client executes an encryp- tion engine that
manages encryption operations. This software module
is accessed by external user applications through the
encrypted database interface. The   proposed
architecture manages five types of information.
All data and metadata stored in the cloud da- tabase
are encrypted. Any application running on a legitimate
client can transparently issue SQL operations (e.g.,
SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE) to the
encrypted cloud database through the encrypted
database interface. Data transferred between the user
application and the encryption engine are not
encrypted, whereas information is always encrypted
before sending it to the cloud database. When an
application issues a new SQL operation, the encrypted
data- base interface contacts the encryption
enginethat   retrieves the encrypted metadata and de-
crypts them with the master key. To improve
performance, the plain metadata are cached locally
by the client. After obtaining the me- tadata, the
encryption engine   is able to issue encrypted SQL
statements to the cloud database, and then to decrypt
the results. The results are returned to the user
application through the en- crypted database interface.
2.1   Adaptive Encryption Schemes
We consider SQL-aware encryption algorithms that
guarantee data confidentiality and allow the cloud
database engine to execute SQL opera- tions over
encrypted data. As each algorithm supports a specific
subset  of SQL operators, we refer to the following
encryption schemes.Outer layers guarantee higher level
of data confiden- tiality and support fewer operations on
encrypted data. Hence, each onion supports a specific set
of operations.
Its onions. For example, the plaintext values associated
with Onion-Eq are   encrypted with Det,   then the Det
value is encrypted with Rand. The most external
layer of an onion   is called actual layer, which
corresponds to its strongest encryption algorithm. The
cloud data- base can only see the actual layer of the
onions, and has no access to inner layers nor to plaintext
data.
Fig. 2 shows an example of the onions   and layers
structures by  considering two plaintext columns
having data types int and varchar. The integer column
is encrypted with Onion-Eq, Onion-Ord, and Onion-
Sum, and the string col- umn is encrypted with
Onion-Eq   and Onion-Search. Each onion represents a
column in the encrypted database struc- ture. The
actual layers of all the onions are set to Rand,
thatguarantees the best data confidentiality level but it
does not allow computations on   encrypted data.
When an equality check is requested on the integer
column the adaptive layer removal mechanism
removes the Rand layer     of Onion-Eq, thus
leaving   Det as its new actual layer.
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2.2 Adaptive Layer Removal
The adaptive layer removal is the  process that
dynamically removes the external layer of an
onion in order to adap- tively support SQL
operations issued by legitimate clients.
Let us describe the details of the adaptive layer
removal mechanism by referring to the following
example. We consider a table T with columns id of
type int and name of type string, and a tenant client
preparing to issue the following statement to the
encrypted cloud database: SELECT FROM T
WHERE id < 10. The client encryption en- gine
analyzes the SQL statement, and iden- tifies that
the operation id < 10 has to be executed on the
encrypted database. Then, the client reads the
metadata and checks whether   there is the
Onion-Ord attribute associated with the column
id because this is the only onion supporting the
operator.
If the actual layer of Onion-Ord asso- ciated
with id is set to Rand, then the client dynamically
invokes a stored procedure on the cloud
database that removes at run- time the Rand
layer of Onion-Ord of the column id, thus leaving
the Ope layer ex- posed. The client can now
encrypt the SELECT query that contains the
operation id
< 10 and issue the encrypted query to the
encrypted database, that executes it on the Ope
layer of Onion-Ord. Any new SQL operation
involving an order comparison on the column id
does not require to invoke again the layer
removal procedure be- cause the actual layer of
Onion-Ord is Ope
.The cloud database can execute     the
adaptive layer removal if and only if a legiti- mate
client invokes the stored procedure andgives to   it
the decryption key of the most external encryption
layer.
Popular cloud database providers adopt two different
bill- ing functions, that  we call linear L and tiered T .
Let us con- sider a generic re- source x. We define xb
as its usage at the b-th billing period and px as its
price. If the billing function is linear, it can be computed
as:
Fig. 4. Example of relationship among  estimation (T ),
reserva- tion (TR ) and billing (TB ) periods.
III. Cost estimation of cloud  database services
We consider a tenant that is interested in esti- mating
the cost of porting his database to a cloud platform. This
porting is a strategic decision that must  evaluate
confidentiality issues and  related costs over   a
medium-long term.   For these reasons, we propose a
model  that includes the overhead  of encryption
schemes and  the   va- riability of database work- load
and     cloud prices.     The   proposed   model     is
general enough to be applied to the  most  popular cloud
database services, such  as Amazon Relational The
uptime and  the  storage billing functions of Amazon
RDS [23] are  linear,  while  the  net- work usage  is a
tiered  billing function. On the other hand, the uptime
billing functions of Azure SQL is linear,   while  the
storage and network billing functions are tiered.
The current version of the prototype supports the main
SQL operations (SELECT, DELETE, INSERT and
UPDATE) and the WHERE clause.  We consider three
TPC-C compli- ant databases having 10 warehouses:
Plaintext (PLAIN) is based on plaintext data.
Encrypted (ENC) re- fers to a statically encrypted data-
base where each column is encrypted at design time
with Database    Service  Enterprise  DB    .Adaptively
Azure   SQL Database    and Rackspace Cloud
Database.
4.1    Cost Model
The cost of a cloud   database service   can be estimated
as a function of three main parameters Cost ¼ f ð Time;
Pricing; Usage Þ;         (1)
Where: Time identifies the time interval T for which the
ten- ant requires the service. Pricing refers  to the prices
of the cloud provider for subscription and   resource
usage they typically tend to diminish dur- ing T . Usage
denotes the total amount of re- sources used by the
tenant;  it typically increases during T . The total cost of
the cloud database service C can be estimated through
the following equation: encrypted (ADAPT) refers to an
encrypted da- tabase in which each column is encrypted
with all the onions supported by its data type (Section
3.3).  In  the  ENC  and  ADAPT  conﬁgurations each
column is set to the highest encryption layer that
supports the SQL operations of the TPC-C workload.
During each TPC-C test lasting for 300 seconds, we
monitor the number of executed TPC-C transactions,
and the response times of all the SQL operations from
the standard TPC-C work- load. We repeat the test for
each database conﬁguration  (PLAIN,  ENC and
ADAPT) for increasing number of cli- ents (from 5 to
20), and for increasing network latencies (from 0 to 120
ms). To guarantee data consistency the three da- tabases
use repeatable read (snapshot) isolation level.
IV. Performance evaluation
The experiments aim to evaluate the overhead caused
by static and adaptive encryption in terms of system
through- put and response time. In Figs. 5 and 6, we
report the num- ber of com- mitted TPC-C transactions
per minute executed on the three cloud database
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conﬁgurations for 5 and 20 concurrent clients,
respectively. We can appreciate that in both cases, and
in all other results not reported for space reasons, the
throughput of the ENC database is close to that of the
PLAIN database. Moreover, as the network latency
increases, even the performance of the ADAPT
database tends to that of the other two configurations.
TABL E 2 Validation of Storage  Usage of TPC-C
Compliant Data- bases
All experimental results show that network la- tencies
higher than 60 ms, which are typical of most cloud
database environments, make the adaptive encryption
overhead almost negligible when considering the
overall set of operations of the TPC-C benchmark.
However, in the ADAPT conﬁguration, for some SQL
operations involv- ing the Ope encryption or for the
encryption of a high number of parameters through
several en- cryption layers (e.g., INSERT), the impact
on the response time is visible even for network laten-
cies higher than 120 ms.
If the workload is characterized by many INSERT
opera- tions, we can conclude that it is a tenant’s duty to
solve the tradeoff between ac- cepting adaptive
encryption overheads and pay- ing the costs related to
an entire database re- en- cryption when workload
changes in statically encrypted databases. It is likely
that this tradeoff can be solved on the basis of the
expected va- riability of the workload. Possible
improvements can be achieved by parallel encryption
algo- rithms that can leverage multi-threading over
different cores, but this research is out of the scope of
this paper. On the positive hand, we observe that the
presented ADAPT conﬁguration represents  a  worst
case  scenario  that  is  fully adaptive, because all
database columns are en- crypted with all the onions
supported by its data type. On the other hand, the ENC
conﬁguration represents a best case scenario that is
completely static, because the user manually deﬁnes the
single encryption scheme to use on each database
column.
We observe that a tenant may choose a partially
adaptive conﬁguration in which a subset of columns are
encrypted with adaptive strategies and others are
statically encrypted. As a conse- quence, performance
of adaptive encryption for many realistic workloads
falls between the ENC and ADAPT scenarios presented
in this section.
The validation demonstrates the efﬁcacy of the
proposed analytical usage estimation methodol- ogy in
the TPC-C workload. Costs evaluations proposed in the
following sections are based on the same usage
estimations.
V. Cost Evaluation
In this section we demonstrate the feasibility of the pro-
posed cost model by applying it to PLAIN, ENC and
ADAPT conﬁgurations (see Section 5) in real cloud
database services. We initially validate the usage
estimation method- ology presented in Section 4.3. We
then analyze how costs vary for different cloud
providers and resource usages. We ﬁnally evaluate
tenant’s costs over a medium-term period equal to three
years by considering realistic resource usage in-
crements and cloud price reductions.
5.1 Validation  of the Usage Estimation
To validate the usage estimation model, we perform
several experiments based on the TPC-C benchmark.
First of all, we validate the storage usage estimation
model. We deploy nine TPC-C compliant databases of
three different sizes: 1, 5 and 10 warehouses (the
number of warehouses is the TPC-C parameter that
inﬂuences the initial database size). For each size, we
generate three data- base conﬁgurations: PLAIN, ENC
and ADAPT. Results are summarized in Table 2.
Estimated storage of PLAIN, ENC and ADAPT are
calculated  by  using  the  analytical  model presented in
Section 4.3. For each estimated value, we report the
estimation error with respect to  the  measured  database
size. Errors are ex- pressed  as a percentage. We
observe that the proposed model always overestimates
the data- base size. However, errors show that
estimations are close to measured sizes. For PLAIN
data- bases, the errors is always below 2%, while for
ENC and ADAPT databases the error is always between
5% and 6%. We then validate the net- work usage
estimation model. We deploy PLAIN, ENC and
ADAPT TPC-C compliant databases, each having 10
warehouses. We ob- serve that network consumption is
invariant with respect to the number of warehouses,
because it only depends on encryption and query
workload. We measure the network usage of the PLAIN
database,  and  we  obtain  an  average  of  7,162 Bytes
per transaction. By using Equation (8). we estimate np
¼ k  548. Hence, we determinek ¼ 13:07. Then we use
this value of k to deter- mine the estimated network
usage of ENC and ADAPT conﬁgurations. We compare
these val- ues with the experimentally measured
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network usages. Results are summarized in Table 3. Es-
timations are quite accurate, since we achieve
VI. Conclusions
There are two main tenant concerns that may prevent
the adoption of the cloud as the ﬁfth utility: data
conﬁdentiality and costs. This paper addresses both
issues in the case of cloud data- base services. These
applications have not yet received adequate attention by
the academic li- terature, but they are of utmost
importance if we consider that almost all important
services are based on one or multiple databases. We
address the data conﬁdentiality concerns by proposing a
novel cloud database architecture that uses adaptive
encryption techniques with no interme- diate servers.
This scheme provides tenants with the best level of
conﬁdentiality for any database workload that is likely
to change in a medium-term period. We investigate the
feasibility and performance of the proposed architecture
through a large set of ex- periments based on a software
prototype subject to the TPC-C standard benchmark.
Our results demonstrate that the network latencies that
are typical of cloud database environments hide most
overheads related to static and adaptive encryp- errors
of 1:2% and   1:4% for the ENC and tion. Moreover,
we propose a model and a me-
ADAPTconﬁgurations,respectively. The valida - tion
demonstrates the efﬁcacy of the proposed analytical
usage estimation methodology in the TPC-C workload.
Costs evaluations proposed in the following sec- tions
are based on the same usage estimations.
6.2 Analysis of Cloud Database  Costs
We analyze cloud database costs with respect to
different cloud provider offers and different sto- rage
and network usages. We consider a billing period equal
to one month, and 24/7 availability (730 uptime hours
per month). We initially es-timate the monthly costs of
a cloud data- base service in the PLAIN, ENC and
ADAPT conﬁgurations with respect to a plaintext
storage usage of 100 GB and a plaintext network usage
of 100 GB. In Table 4, we report the results for the
following cloud instances: Small, Large, and High
Memory: Double Extra Large from Ama- zon RDS
Premium P1 and Premium P2 from SQL Azure.
Methodology that  allow  a  tenant  to  estimate the costs
of plain and encrypted cloud database ser- vices even in
the case of workload and cloud price variations in a
medium-term horizon. By applying the model to actual
cloud provider prices, we can deter- mine the
encryption and adaptive encryption costs for data
conﬁdentiality. Future research could evaluate the
proposed or alternative architectures for multi-user key
distribution schemes and under different threat model
hypotheses.
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